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Abstract 
Goat producers in Inhassoro follow traditional management practices that lead to low supply of low quality goats.  
This has negative impacts on profitability, and on market access. Traders who buy in the Inhassoro locality buy only 
small volumes, and buyers from external markets are unaware of potential market supply in Inhassoro. This 
interaction of production constraints and limited information flows in the value chain was addressed using a 
system dynamics model for various commercialization scenarios. Simulation results show that improving goat 
production and animal health practices alone without concomitant improvements in market access have negative 
impacts on the financial performance of producers and no impact on other value chain actors. However, 
interventions that both improve market access and animal health have significant positive impacts on the financial 
performance of all value chain actors.  The model’s explicit treatment of herd dynamics contribute significantly to 
these conclusions, particularly the lagged production response inherent in livestock breeding systems.      
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1 Introduction 
Goats offer a potentially strong return on investment for smallholder producers in developing countries (Van 
Rooyen & Homann, 2008; Devendra & Chantalakhana, 2002).  Goats’ reproduction rate is relatively high, taking 5-6 
months for a kid to mature and be available for sale or breeding.  In Mozambique, as in much of the developing 
world, farmers maintain stocks of goats, both for the purpose of meat consumption during special occasions and 
for cash needs during emergencies. The production of goats in the Inhassoro district of Mozambique uses 
traditional methods, with limited application and knowledge of more advanced management practices in breeding 
and animal health. Less than 10% of farmers report keeping goats as their main occupation (Boogaard et al. 2012).  
As goat raising is commonly secondary to crop production, other animal production or other economic activities, 
there is little attention given to goat stocks’ management, nor to commercial aspects of production and marketing 
efficiently (imGoats Baseline Report, 2012; Peham, 2012; Boogaard et al. 2012). These features of the goat system 
constrain its potential as a means of sustainably contributing to Inhassoro’s smallholder farmer livelihoods. 
The resulting low qualities and quantities of Inhassoro’s goats are of limited interest to buyers in regional and 
national networks such as those serving the city of Maputo to the south.  Markets and trading channels are limited 
to the Inhassoro market, wherein a few goats per week are sold to Inhassoro butchers, and some 10-15 goats per 
week sold at roadsides (Peham, 2012). This isolation simultaneously limits market access for producers, and the 
incentives for investment and commercialization.     
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Thus, limitations of goat production practices in Inhassoro and information gaps among actors in larger markets 
(e.g. Maputo and nearby Maxixe) and Inhassoro producers constrain commercialization of the smallholder goat 
sector in Inhassoro district.  In response, the imGoats project (www.imgoats.org) targeted Inhassoro district for 
improvement of the livelihoods of smallholder goat keepers. The project conducted a variety of research and field 
activities and workshops to design and implement interventions:  improving producers’ access to animal health 
services and better production practices, and organizing goat fairs to improve goat marketing activities and 
connect goat producers to goat buyers (see Boogaard et al (2012)). 
Embrace of a market-oriented system offers potential for change, but this would require significant investments to 
boost productivity, as well as increase goat supplies and attract traders from larger markets such as Maputo and 
Maxixe. Such investment has been shown to be accelerated by collaboration amongst value chain actors (Devaux, 
et al., 2009; Cotula & Vermeulen, 2010) and other with parties (government and NGOs) (Poultonet al., 2006; 
Humphrey, 2006).  However, Inhassoro’s value chain climate is typically one where information exchange between 
value chain actors is scarce, and thus collaboration amongst actors is limited. At an operational level, it is not clear 
ex-ante which interventions or investments within the value chain would be most cost-effective for smallholders.  
Further, tradeoffs between value chain efficiency and smallholder inclusion (Warning & Key, 2002) are likely. These 
issues suggest a need to complement qualitative assessments of the governance patterns in the goat value chain 
with quantitative methods that assess tradeoffs amongst interventions.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively the goat production and marketing system in Inhassoro 
district, and guide future investment.  It complements previous work in the imGoats project by developing a model 
that analyzes intervention strategies for enhancing livelihoods of marginalized groups in rural areas of southern 
Mozambique. In this application we analyze interventions aimed at raising productivity and supply (e.g. providing 
veterinary services to goat farmers) and enhancing information flows among value chain actors to improve 
producer access to large goat markets. The paper attempts to answer the following questions: 
• What are the physical and financial consequences for value chain actors of interventions that provide 
veterinary services to improve goat productivity and quality? 
• What is the impact on value chain actors of improving information flows between markets with high 
demand for goats, and the Inhassoro producers?  
In a developing country setting such as Mozambique, understanding such impacts, particularly among smallholder 
producers, will have important policy ramifications for the design of successful policy reforms. Given the 
interaction amongst production and supply, markets and trading stages, the nature of smallholders’ goat 
enterprises and its production lags following management decisions, and apparent constraints on information 
flow, a model of these elements of the system was developed.  The resulting system dynamics (SD) model, 
calibrated to a target set of 350 farmers in 18 communities, was used to provide a framework for ex-ante testing of 
various interventions in the Inhassoro goat value chain. This allows us to conduct policy scenarios that assess both 
value chain performance and the potential benefits of alternative interventions on marginalized smallholder 
livestock producers (Rich et al. 2011). Of particular interest is the facility of the SD model to capture production 
lags and their implications for responses to interventions and policy reforms that are characterized by delay.  
These delays can lead to future uncertainty and volatility that other modeling frameworks are less equipped to 
address.  
Although conventional wisdom suggests that shortages of supply are the main constraint in linking Inhassoro goat 
producers to the main market, our model results showed that interventions that focus on improving information 
flows between different actors could significantly improve the profitability of Inhassoro smallholder goat 
producers, even if productivity in the chain remains low. Productivity improvements in the absence of changes in 
chain-level governance would not appreciably improve market access, suggesting a re-think in the prioritization of 
interventions away from technical ones and more towards institutional improvements in the value chain that alter 
governance patterns. This would necessitate the support of  NGOs and other third parties to facilitate information 
exchange. At the same time, model results show technical improvements in productivity would improve market 
access as an important second-round effect once information constraints are addressed. 
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2 Background to the Inhassoro goat value chain: survey and fieldwork results  
This section of the paper is based on fieldwork conducted by the authors (in cooperation with imGoats project field 
staff) in Inhassoro, and a survey prepared by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). The survey was implemented by ILRI and CARE International in 
goat markets in Massinga, Maxixe, Inhambane, Zavala, Xai-Xai, Manhiça and Maputo. 
Figure 1 identifies the key locations in the supply of goats to Maputo as the major consumption point.   The 
demand for goats is reported to be higher during Christmas holidays, Independence Day, and Muslim celebrations 
following Ramadan.  Goat trading in Maputo is significant, with traders reporting handling between 100-200 goats 
per trader per month, or per week, depending on the season. Survey results revealed that traders in Maputo buy 
goats in Tete province (Central Mozambique), despite Inhassoro’s being less than half the distance from Maputo. 
Goat supplies in the target markets were found to come from Govuro, Mabote, Funhalouro, Machanga, 
Muchungue, Tete, Mabote, Gorongosa, Rio Buzi, Chissiguana, Massangena, Buzi, Mutarara, Chimoio, and 
Mabalane. Tete is the main supplier to large markets. Traders reported that they are able to obtain the quality and 
quantity of goats they need in Tete without supply shortages. In contrast, in Inhassoro the required quantity of 
goats was reported to be not readily available. Despite Inhassoro’s being geographically close to larger markets 
such as Maputo and Maxixe, the lack of reliable goat supply increases organization, assembly, and transportation 
costs, making Inhassoro a relatively undesirable place to buy goats. An interesting finding from the survey was that 
Maputo traders were willing to support producers to increase their production capacity, in return for obtaining a 
reliable supply of goats; however traders in Maxixe and Xai-Xai reported being less interested in such 
arrangements. Traders in Inhorasso report that there are not enough goats available for sale, to meet their 
demand.  Traders outside Inhassoro report, in many cases, not knowing that goats are available for sale in 
Inhorasso. 
 
Figure 1. Map of goat supply chain in Southern Mozambique 
On the supply side, there is a shortage of goats for sale in Inhassoro. One estimate (Baseline Report, 2012; Peham, 
2012) indicates that on average goat keeper households in Inhassoro keep 8.4 goats and, on average, sell one or 
two goats per year depending on cash needs, season, and buyer availability. Survey results show that smallholder 
goat keepers in Inhassoro are willing to increase their herd size. They report insufficient financial resources as the 
main reason for not doing so. 
Overcoming these demand and supply constraints is treated here, for the purposes of discussion, as a process 
of commercialization: essentially of increasing traded volumes by way of enabling transactions.  On this basis, 
the results of the survey were communicated to local Serviços Distritais das Actividades Economicas (SDAE, 
the District Services for Economic Activities) staff in Inhassoro, CARE International and ILRI staff for further 
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validation and analysis. The authors organized a focus group discussion with SDAE officials in Inhassoro 
district, while an interview was conducted with the head of provincial livestock services to analyze ways of 
tackling the commercialization-related challenges addressed above, and to discuss feasible interventions. The 
following were proposed as ways forward for Inhassoro: 
1. Facilitation of information flow from producers and traders: specifically on the availability of goats for 
sale, and their quality 
2. Facilitation of information flow from traders to producers: specifically on the demand for goats 
throughout the season and the markets’ quality requirements 
3. Dissemination of information to producers on the costs inherent in the goat value chain (aggregation, 
transport, and goat prices), and the steps necessary to reduce them so that Inhorasso producers compete 
with those in other locations.  Contract farming is one option to be investigated. 
4. Facilitation, by SDAE, of communication among value chain actors to find locations for goat fairs and look 
for market opportunities outside Inhassoro district by contacting buyers in other markets 
5. Organizing farmers and registering their herds to circumvent the market in stolen goats. 
Based on these insights from the survey and fieldwork, we concluded that the supply of goats and lack of 
information flow between Inhassoro producers and larger markets are the two major constraints that impede the 
commercialization of the goat value chain in Inhassoro. Notably, these constraints feature some simultaneity 
based around high costs on the part of traders and low profitability on the part of producers. The intervention 
strategies examined in this paper target alleviating these two constraints.  
 
3 Methodology and model structure 
We used a system dynamics modeling approach to develop a dynamic value chain model that highlights the 
changes and performance of the goat value chain among involved actors over time (Rich et al. 2011). System 
dynamics (SD) is a methodology that studies the dynamic interactions and feedback effects among a set of 
variables that compose a system (Forrester 1961; Sterman, 2002; Sterman 2010). Our model relies on concepts 
from Sterman (2000), while our general value chain structure draws on Tchale and Keyser (2010), UNIDO (2009), 
FAO (2012) and Kaplinsky and Morris (2000).  
Data and specific characteristics of the Inhassoro goat value chain draw on research conducted in the imGoats 
project and field work. We used both qualitative and quantitative data to build the model and initialize parameters 
and the initial state of the system. Data sources include imGoats’ Baseline Report (2012), Peham (2012), imGoats’ 
Innovation Platform meeting reports (ILRI, 2011-2012), and supplementary short reports provided by ILRI staff in 
Inhassoro. We complemented the sources of data through the implementation of a survey developed by NUPI and 
ILRI and administered by ILRI and CARE International in markets of districts/municipalities of Massinga, Maxixe, 
Inhambane, Zavala, Xai-Xai, Manhiça and Maputo, from 8 – 12 October 2012, and through fieldwork conducted by 
the authors.  
The model includes two main sectors: production and market; and a policy sector.  The production sector of the 
model was constructed based on the livestock model found in Sterman (2010). Also based on Sterman (2010), the 
model’s market sector is an expansion to include downstream actors such as aggregators, traders, and retailers. 
We also attached a financial model to evaluate the profitability of the various actors in the value chain. Financial 
performance (i.e. changes in value chain actors’ cumulative profit) is measured throughout the model for the main 
value chain actors. The model’s policy sector simulates changes in trading and management practices. The various 
sectors are connected to each other through flows of information, products, and payments, and feature various 
feedback loops.  Figure 2 is a generic portrayal of the model’s main components and feedback interactions.  
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Figure 2. Portrayal of model structure 
In figure 2, the stocks (boxes) represent producer stocks of goats and the inventories of animals (or meat) of the 
different value chain actors. For example, “Breeding Goats” represents the number of breeding goats in producer 
stocks, while “Retailers Inventory” represents the number of goats (and goat carcasses) in retailer inventories. 
Stocks change through inflows and outflows, which are governed by variables that regulate such flows: technical 
and/or market parameters. Connectors (arrows) between actors represent information feedback loops. 
Interactions between supply and demand sides of the market, and the feedback effects of price on both supply 
and demand, exist in all market channels. In essence, our model is an expansion of the SD supply and demand 
model of Whelan and Msefer (1996) in which inventory decisions by downstream actors influence prices, which 
subsequently affect the incentives for producers to market animals in the different market channels based on their 
level of market integration. Generally, goats and goat meat products flow from producers to end markets by way 
of value chain actors, while money flows from end markets to producers along the value chain. Information flows 
occur in both directions. As in all models, there are simplifications employed which introduce limitations such as 
the omission of input suppliers and credit providers from the model, and an all-or-nothing treatment of veterinary 
services and animal health which omits disease evolution. Although these simplifications ignore important 
elements of Inhorasso’s goat value chain, the resulting focus on the abovementioned sectors allows a significant 
advance on previous analyses and establishes a basis for future inclusion of further detail. 
 
4 Simulation Results and Analysis  
The constructed value chain model was used to run four scenarios: (1) baseline; (2) provision of veterinary 
services; (3) an information intervention to link Inhassoro goat producers to targeted large markets; and (4) 
provision of veterinary services and linking of Inhassoro producers to large markets (i.e. a combination of scenarios 
2 and 3). Scenarios’ details are as follows:  
1. Baseline scenario: we use the model to replicate the status quo of goat production and marketing in 
Inhassoro.  Table 1 shows the values used (average column in the table) for model parameters and initial 
values.  
2. Scenario 2: Provision of veterinary services to enhance production: In this scenario, we look at the effect of 
provision to producers of basic veterinary services on physical and financial performance, as well as on 
variables further downstream. This scenario targets reducing goat deaths at all stages of goats’ development. 
Table 2 presents the changes used in model parameters and costs. We assume that producers start providing 
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basic veterinary services at the beginning of the simulation, taking one year to have all goats covered.  
Assumed veterinary services include treatments against internal and external parasites, and the treatment of 
wounds. This scenario is motivated by the efforts undertaken by the imGoats project to provide veterinary 
services and encourage producers to use such services.  
3. Scenario 3: Improvement of information links in the value chain: In this scenario, we report the results from 
linking Inhassoro goat producers to larger markets such as Maputo. We simulate two channels for goat 
demand: (1) the local market in Inhassoro, and (2) larger markets as described above. Currently, Inhassoro 
goat producers have limited or no access to larger markets, and thus larger markets are targeted by our 
proposed information intervention. Figure 3 shows the structure of information, and flows of goats and cash 
between producers and goat markets. We assume that increasing goat flocks at producers stocks without 
addressing issues of limited information flow among chain actors has limited influence on accessing markets 
outside Inhassoro as traders in these markets need to be informed about goat availability in Inhassoro.   
 
 
Figure 3. Information intervention to link Inhassoro producers to larger markets 
 
In the presence of information flow among value chain actors (this can be done via SDAE to arrange goat fairs), 
we assume that as the number of goats in producer herds rises, the probability of attracting buyers in larger 
markets increases.  That is, the model assumes that when the volume of goat herds increase in the targeted 
communities, then large traders and retailers have incentives to start obtaining parts of their supply in 
Inhassoro through aggregators and traders. This trading link is activated via information flow between 
producers and traders in larger markets. This information flow feeds goat availability in Inhassoro into a 
random probability function which is linked to traders demand in larger markets. We have made conservative 
assumption by assuming that doubling number of goats for sales in Inhassoro only increases probability of 
trading by 1% per time unit (week) because the targeted producers in this study are small producers (350 
producers located in 18 communities, and on average each producers own 8.4 goats) located in different 
communities geographically far from each other. This intervention was motivated by the efforts undertaken 
under the imGoats project to link producers and goat buyers through goat fairs.   
 
4. Scenario 4: Provision of veterinary services + improvement of information links. In this scenario, we combine 
scenarios 2 and 3. In scenario 4, we further assume that producers invest in veterinary services to enhance 
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both goat quantities and quality: this in turn improves the probability of access to the larger markets. That is, 
the combined effect of veterinary provisions and increased goat quantity increase the probability of trading by 
additional 1% to 10% (based on what portion of goat population covered by veterinary provisions, generally, it 
takes one year to provide veterinary services to all goats in the area from the moment producers begin 
investing in animal health) as animal condition is another factor that attracts buyers. 
Kanar H. Hamza et al. 
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Table 1. 
Goat Production parameters 
Parameters 
Peham (2012) 
+ Baseline 
(2012) Reports 
Extension 
officer 1 
(CARE) 
Extension 
Officer 2 (CARE) 
Veterinarian     
(Saskia 
Hendrickx)  
Fieldwork     
(author) Average Time unit 
Breeding stock productivity  0.9* 0.9 0.95 
  
0.9*** Unitless 
Litter size 1.4 1.5 1 1 1.5 1.28 Goat/litter 
Litter per year 1.05 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.37 Litter/goat/year 
Gestation period 6 4 5 5 5 5 Month 
Abortion Rate 0.17 0.15 0.05** 
  
0.16 1/year 
Young Goat Fractional Death Rate 0.33 0.05** 0.2 
 
0.3 0.28 1/year 
Time to Mature 
 
6 6 
  
6 Months  
Various Consumption Rate 0.25* 0.2-0.3 0.2-0.3 
  
0.4 1/year 
Mature Fractional Death Rate 0.1 
    
0.1 1/year 
Breeding Stock Replenishment Rate 
 
0.6-0.7 0.6-0.7 
  
0.65 1/year 
Breeding Stock Fractional Death Rate 0.1 0.03** 0.05** 
  
0.1 1/year 
Average breeding period 4* 5 3 to 4 
 
3 3.9 Year 
* Rough estimation from reports  
** After treatments  
*** We assume that 10% of breeding stock are males kept for breeding purposes 
 
Table 2. 
Intervention costs (Metical) and efficacy 
Scenario 2 (veterinary services) 
parameter changes   
Before 
Intervention 
After 
Intervention Costs/Goat/Year 
Abortion Rate 0.15 0.05 
75 Young Goat Death Rate 0.28 0.1 
Adult Death Rate 0.1 0.05 
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Table 3. 
Average prices and operation costs per goat 
parameter Producers Aggregators Local Butchers Traders Retailers 
Average Goat Price  830* 1050* 1450* 1350* 2000* 
Production Costs Per Goat  50 
   
  
Transportation Cost Per Goat 
 
35 70 50**   
Licenses 
  
30 
 
30 
Inspection 
  
50 
 
50 
Slaughter 
  
100 
 
100 
Labor 65 65 50 150 160 
Other Costs 
 
20 
 
35 60 
Total (operation) Costs 115 120 300 185 400 
* These are initial prices, price changes based on supply and demand  
** Changes depending on traded goat quantity 
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5 Model runs and results 
We ran the model over a five-year time horizon (260 weeks). We report the results of the investigated scenarios 
alongside each other to facilitate comparison of impacts. We report results of total supply, total demand, price 
dynamics for producers, inventories held by different value chain actors (producers, aggregators, traders, and 
retailers), and their respective cumulative profits. The model endogenizes price relationships following Whelan and 
Msefer (1996) in that as prices rise, producer willingness to sell increases, though this has an implication on the 
volume of animal stocks in future periods. By contrast, an increase in price reduces demand that feeds back to the 
market and causes supply to respond through changes in price. The pattern of price development is the same in all 
market channels in that price increases downstream in the chain according to assumed marketing margins 
between actors/stage of the chain. 
In all the figures presented below, trend 1 represents scenario 1, trend 2 represents scenario 2, trend 3 represents 
scenario 3, and trend 4 represents scenario 4. Figures 4-6 show the supply of goats from Inhassoro, demand for 
Inhassoro’s goats in local and external markets, and the dynamics of goat prices, respectively. In scenario 1 and 2, 
supply, demand, and prices exhibit regular, though relatively low amplitude, cycles. In both scenarios, we assume 
relatively simple marketing behavior of goats based on local (Inhassoro district) demand and some variation due to 
market seasonality. However, in scenario 3 and 4, we extend the goat value chain by introducing semi-frequent 
links between farmers and both local markets and long-distance markets such as Maputo. This requires sufficient 
goats in a community (or a few nearby communities) to make trading with large buyers financially economically 
feasible for buyers.  
Scenario 3 highlights that five trading activities between Inhassoro and larger markets take place over a five-year 
period, while scenario 4 shows about 18 trading activities over the same time horizon. The trading events in 
scenario 3 and 4 are measured endogenously based on quantity and/or quality of goats in producers stocks.  
Scenario 3 shows fewer trading activities than scenario 4 because the number of goats and their quality is better in 
scenario 4 relative to scenario 3 due to the additional investment in veterinary services in scenario 4. However, 
trading between Inhassoro and larger markets reduces marketable goat numbers for producers, so that there is a 
lag in supplies from Inhassoro in future periods. As trading increases between Inhassoro and larger markets, prices 
in Inhassoro become more volatile and take longer to get back the levels before the trading shocks.  
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Figure 4. Total goat supply 
 
 
Figure 5. Total goat demand 
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Figure 6. Price dynamics at the producer level 
Figures 7 to 11 show total goats in producer stocks; potentially marketable goats in producer stocks (i.e. a fraction 
of total goats); and inventories of aggregators, traders, and retailers, respectively. In the baseline, goat populations 
rise due to low sales rates and no environmental or carrying capacity feedbacks to limit animal numbers (we do 
not have information about carrying capacity in the study area). In scenario 2, producers invest in veterinary 
services that lead to an even faster increase in population growth. However, under scenarios 3 and 4, trading 
channels between Inhassoro and larger markets open and create cyclical, market-based patterns of animal stocks. 
As traders buy large quantities of goats, producer stocks decline, while it takes some time for goat populations to 
rise again due to time lags in goat production from breeding to adulthood. While there is more trading under 
scenario 4, goat populations are higher in scenario 4 than in scenario 3 as goats are more productive due to 
improved veterinary services. The inventory levels of external traders and retailers are zero under scenario 1 and 2 
because these actors are not engaged in the Inhassoro value chain under either scenario. Inventory levels of 
aggregators are very low as their trading activities are limited. However, under scenario 3 and 4, greater market 
activities induce a rise in inventories among downstream value chain actors.  
 
Figure 7. Total number of goats in producers stocks 
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Figure 8. Marketable goats (old males and females, adult males, and young male goats) in producers stocks 
 
 
Figure 9. Goats in aggregators inventory 
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Figure 10. Goats in traders inventory 
 
 
Figure 11. Goats (goat carcass) in retailers inventory 
Changes in goat prices, supply and demand, and inventories influence the cumulative profits of different value 
chain actors. There are different costs involved in producing goats, maintaining inventories, and engaging in other 
activities such as renting facilities, transportation, labor costs, etc. (table 3) that affect profitability. Figures 12 to 
16 show the cumulative profits of producers, aggregators, traders, retailers, and local (Inhassoro) butchers. Profits 
for producers in the baseline start positive and then decline to become negative after 2.5 years in the simulation 
period. This is because increasing producer stocks increases operational costs. Under scenario 2, producer profits 
decline even faster relative to scenario 1 due to even higher operational costs as a result of investments in 
veterinary services that result in higher volumes of animals without any extended market in which to sell them.  
By contrast, under scenarios 3 and 4, the cumulative profits of all value chain actors increases significantly; this 
result is magnified further in scenario 4. Under scenario 4, both goat productivity and production rise to supply the 
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market with more goats. Table 4 summarizes the financial performance of the different value chains actors under 
each scenario relative to the baseline scenario.     
Table 4. 
Changes in value chain actors financial performance 
Scenarios Producers  Local butcher (Inhassoro) Aggregators Traders*  Retailers*  
Scenario 2 Vs. 1  -69% no change  no change NA NA 
Scenario 3 Vs. 1 110% -3% 192% NA NA 
Scenario 4 Vs. 1 186% 3.30% 1056% NA NA 
Scenario 4 Vs. 3* NA NA NA 141% 145% 
 
 
Figure 12. Producers cumulative profit 
 
Figure 13. Aggregators cumulative profit 
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Figure 14. Traders cumulative profit 
 
 
Figure 15. Retailers cumulative profit 
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Figure 16. Local butchers cumulative profit 
6 Conclusions  
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model goat markets for isolated communities in Mozambique. The SD 
approach attempts to incorporate the systems related to goat production and marketing, and significantly, the lags 
in production and marketing response due to goat herd dynamics.  Scenarios investigated center on 
commercialization, in the sense that connecting producers to an expanded range of marketing options is both an 
opportunity for improved producer welfare as well as an impetus for investments in such improvements as animal 
health.    
Our results project that in the absence of linking Inhassoro goat producers to larger markets (such as Maputo), 
improving goat production and animal health practices alone would have negative impacts on the financial 
performance of producers and no impact on other value chain actors. This is because such a scenario raises the 
supply of goats without making any changes in market access. However, a more system-oriented strategy that 
combines improved productivity and links Inhassoro producers to larger goat markets has a significant positive 
impact on all value chain actors’ profits. However, the rewards of such a scenario are largely dissipated among end 
market actors (aggregators, traders, and retailers), while the financial risks are borne solely by producers. 
Our model results highlight the important distributional impacts along the value chain associated with improving 
veterinary services and market access to larger goat markets in Inhassoro district in Southern Mozambique. The 
model showed under a business-as-usual scenario (baseline scenario), that goat producers earn small profits in the 
short term while losing money in the medium and long term. Other value chain actors (aggregators and local 
butchers) have limited economic returns. Such a business-as-usual scenario is not sustainable in economic terms. 
The model showed that not only are supply shortages a problem for further commercialization of the Inhassoro 
goat value chain, but also that there is a lack of information between producers and larger markets (and vice versa) 
that precludes a potentially lucrative trade. Facilitating information flows between producers and the larger 
market could increase producer access to larger markets outside Inhassoro district and hence increase the 
profitability of goat production activities for producers and other value chain actors. Moreover, it would generate, 
or magnify, benefits from other interventions, such as the animal health improvements simulated here.  
Incorporation of this interaction between markets and productivity is a strength of the SD framework used. 
Improving risk- and cost-sharing across the chain is an important medium-run effect and an important area for 
future research and intervention. This paper contributes to the development of pro-poor, smallholder-oriented 
livestock policy scenarios, providing a platform for engaging government agencies, international organizations, and 
NGOs to better develop more sustainable livestock value chains. 
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Extensions to this model which would provide greater insight into approaches to such interventions include the 
explicit modeling of disease dynamics and an animal growth response to veterinary care.  Furthermore, the model 
could be developed to incorporate alternative modalities for cost sharing and potential service delivery (e.g., public 
vs. private). 
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